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Abstract
Security protocols used in today’s communication are complex and it is very difficult to analyze
and optimize them. Literature reports some results which optimize security protocols. In the
case of devices with limited resources (mobile phones, PDA, sensors) the speed and efficiency
of the process is crucial for their stable work. Security methods used during transporting
the data between parties are crucial as for as efficiency is concerned. However, optimization
cannot significantly reduce the security of the process. We must remember that in many
fields (e.g. e-banking, e-court etc.) security level will always be the main factor. In this
paper, we show how to optimize security protocols in terms of the security level. We present
the visualization tool for the adaptable security model, which defines the protection level of
the transmitted data. These elements help us analyze and optimize a cryptographic protocol.
The presented optimization results are based on the TLS protocol. We describe this protocol
by the adaptable model and we create different versions of the protocol. Finally, we discuss
differences between them and their impact on the protection level.
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1. Introduction
Nowadays, for secure realization of electronic processes we can use different
security protocols. If the sites of the protocols are communicating by means
of the high performance devices then the protocol can be used in the standard
way defined by the authors. The problem is if the protocol is realized by the
systems with limited resources (mobile phones, PDA, sensors). The capability
of these devices is the barrier of secure communication with each other.
In the first stage, finding a compromise between security and efficiency often
begins at hardware. R.Roman et al. in [1] present a survey for cryptographic
primitives and implementations for extremely constrained hardware - sensor
network nodes. In turn, B.Kayayurt and T.Tuglular in [2] use the TLS Protocol
to create end-to-end security implementation for mobile devices. Unfortunately,
sometimes the dedicated implementation, for a given hardware is not sufficient
and we must improve protocol in a different layer. The authors of cryptographic
protocols often allow us to select the features such as encryption algorithms or
their modes of operation. These modifications affect performance. In many
cases, modification of configuration is not enough and the only option in or-
der to improve the properties is the modification of the construction protocol.
A. Elgohary et al. in [3] introduce the enhancement for SSL/TLS, making it
more efficient. The modification of the protocol configuration is well tested and
indicates that this kind of the optimization is safe. The optimization which
refers to modification of the protocol construction is very risky.
Another problem is the evaluation of the protocol optimization process. Se-
curity protocols are very complex and we need models with analysis tools to
determine how our modifications influence the whole. Generally, security pro-
tocols are analyzed using formal models. These methods use high abstraction
to represent the security protocol and are mainly used for protocol verification.
Therefore, these models can detect only restricted class of attacks. The best
known representative of this group of models is BAN Logic, introduced in [7].
A. Yasinsac and J. Childs in [4] analyze the TLS protocol by formal methods.
Besides formal correctness analysis, estimation of the risk of the processes is
very important. M.Gerber and R.Solms in [13], based on properties of assets,
characterize the probability of incident occurrence. Another approach to es-
timate the risk of processes is presented by Z.Dwaikat and F.Parisi-Presicce
in [14]. Their model specifies security services used in the protocol, and then
determines the risk of an attack.
In this article, we use the model which is a representative of Quality of Pro-
tection (QoP) models [4, 8, 9]. QoP models allow calculating different versions
of the protocol which protects the transmitted data on different security levels.
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In the literature one can find only a couple of articles about QoP because this
security topic is one of the latest approaches. S.Lindskog and E.Jonsson try
to extend the security layer in a few Quality of Service (QoS) architectures
[9]. Unfortunately, the described methods are limited to the confidentiality
of the data. These methods are based on different configurations of the cryp-
tographic modules. C.S. Ong et al. in [8] present QoP mechanisms, which
define security levels depending on security parameters. These parameters are:
a key length, the length and contents of an encrypted block of data. P. Sch-
neck and K. Schwan [16] proposed the adaptable protocol concentrating on the
authorization. By means of this protocol one can change the version of the
authorization protocol which finally changes the parameters of the asymmetric
and symmetric ciphers. Y. Sun and A. Kumar [15] create the QoP models
based on the vulnerabilities analysis which are represented by the attack trees.
The leaves of the trees are described by means of special metrics of security.
These metrics are used for describing individual characteristics of the attack.
Unfortunately, the majority of the QoP models can be realized only for the
three main security services: confidentiality, integrity and authorization. In ar-
ticle [5] B. Ksiez˙opolski and Z. Kotulski introduce a mechanism for adaptable
security which can be realized for all the security services. In Section 3 we
briefly present the model, which B. Ksiez˙opolski and Z. Kotulski introduce in
[5].
In addition to the models, we often need a program that makes it easier
to work with the model. Such a program is AVISPA that is a project for
automated validation of security protocols. This tool and work with it are
described in [11]. The configuration of the model was prepared by means of
the SPOT application [12] which is the visualization of the model.
We have organized this paper as follows: Section 2 presents the TLS Record
and TLS Handshake protocols. Section 3 briefly describes the model and TLS
Handshake Protocol in the model. Next, in Section 4 we specify the SPOT
analysis tool. Section 5 presents the methods of optimization of the protocol
and the obtained results. Finally, in Section 6, we comment results and notify
conclusions.
2. TLS protocol
In this section, we shortly present the protocol, which we have chosen for the
analysis. It will be Transport Layer Security (TLS) Handshake Protocol version
1.2 [6]. The TLS protocol is continuation of the SSL protocol and it is designed
to provide privacy and data integrity between two communicating applications.
The TLS and SSL protocols are widely used with many network protocols (like
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HTTP, SMTP, POP, SSH) and many applications provide TLS/SSL support
to ensure security. TLS is the application protocol independent and it consists
of two layers: the TLS Handshake Protocol and the TLS Record Protocol. The
stack of protocols is shown in Figure 1. The task of the TLS Record Protocol
is to provide two main security properties for the network connections: confi-
dentiality and reliability. The confidentiality of the transmitted data is realized
by symmetric cryptography for data encryption and keyed MAC for message
integrity (reliable). The TLS Record Protocol is also used for encapsulation.
In the next section the TLS Handshake Protocol will be described in detail.
Fig. 1. TLS Protocol stack
2.1. TLS Handshake Protocol.
The goals of TLS Handshake Protocol are: authenticate the server and client
between themselves, set cryptographic keys and an encryption algorithm by
negotiation. These actions are performed before the transmission of data. At
least one participant of communication must be authenticated and it is real-
ized by asymmetric or public key cryptography. The negotiation process must
be resistant to Man-in-the-middle attack so the shared secret is known only
for the server and client. The negotiations process must be also reliable so
any modification of the negotiation process is detected by the parties to the
communication.
In the following we present a simple scenario in TLS Handshake which will
be further optimized. Client wants to verify the server and next connect with
the server by secure connection. The full message flow is presented in Figure 2.
1. A Client sends the ClientHello message. This message contains the follow-
ing attributes: TLS Protocol version, session id, a list of available cipher
suite, compression method and random values. The server responds with a
ServerHello, which establishes the version of TLS Protocol, session id (when
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Fig. 2. Message flow for a full handshake in TLS Protocol 1.2
session is resumed), cipher suite and compression method. It also sends
random values within ServerHello.
2. Next the Server sends the Certificate message which includes its certificate.
Sending this message is not necessary, it depends on the selected cipher
suite. Next message which may be sent is ServerKeyExchange. The server
sends it when the server certificate is only for signing, or the server has no
certificate. Next the server may send the CertificateRequest message. This
message requests a certificate from the client, it may be sent if the server is
authenticated and it also depends on the selected cipher suite. The server
sends ServerHelloDone, signalling that this phase is done.
3. Now it is time for messages from a client. The client must send its certifi-
cate in the Certificate message only if the server requested it by the Certifi-
cateRequest message. Next the client sends the ClientKeyExchange message.
Depending on the selected cipher this message may have different contents.
To prove that a client has access to the private key in the certificate, the
client sends a digitally-signed CertificateVerify message. Now a ChangeCi-
pherSpec message is sent. The client sends it to signal the server that he
started to use the encryption. Finally, the encrypted Finished message is
sent by the client.
4. Similarly, in response, the server sends ChangeCipherSpec and the encrypted
Finished message.
5. The handshake is complete. Now, the server and client can exchange en-
crypted Application Data.
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3. The model
The realization of an electronic process strongly depends on the proper level
of security.
The security level of an electronic process depends on several factors. This
level can be modified by the choice of security elements applied in a protection
system. In the model of the adaptable security [4], one can suggest an analytical
expression to calculate the security level; its numerical value is a function of
three primary parameters:
1. L - the protection level;
2. P - the probability of an incident occurrence;
3. ω - the impact of a successful attack.
In the following subsections we describe these elements. Every protocol is di-
vided into subprotocols and, within these subprotocols, into steps. The main
parameters listed in this section are computed for each service in each step.
The calculation is prepared by means of the formula introduced in Section 3.4.
The TLS Handshake is subprotocol of the TLS and we split it only into steps.
We presented this division in the previous subsection.
3.1. The protection level (L).
Security services are realized by security mechanisms and every service can
be realized in different ways. The security mechanism has attribute L. It is
the protection level, defined in percent and describes the contribution of the
protection of a particular service to the global protection level. In Table 1 the
security services and the security mechanisms, with appropriate L values, for
the TLS Handshake protocol are presented.
3.2. The probability of an incident occurrence (P ).
The details about the used security mechanisms are represented by the trees.
In Fig 3 we can see the component tree for the integrity service. Selection of
leaves refers to the selection of the security mechanism particular configuration
which will be used in the protocol. Every leaf is described by the following
parameters:
– LZ – assets gained during successful attach on a given security element (100%
= compromising the whole protocol);
– LK – knowledge needed for an attack (100% = expert);
– LP – costs needed for an attack (100% = the highest cost);
– C – communication steps as an additional possibility of attack, C ∈ [0/0.1]
(0.1 = the highest threat);
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– M – practical implementation. The difficulty in implementing increases the
probability of incorrect configuration. Error reports are an additional source
of information, etc. M ∈ [0/0.1] (0.1 = the highest threat).
Within service we define the additional security parameters:
– PP – global assets possible to gain in a given process PP ∈ [0/0.1] (0.1 =
the highest threat);
– I – kind of institution realizing the information process. Some of the institu-
tions are of high threat. I ∈ [0/0.1] (0.1 = the highest threat);
– H – potential risk for an attacker in the case of identification. The legal
system and punishment of the countries where the process is realized.
H ∈ [0/0.1] (0.1 = a country with the lowest legal restrictions);
When we determine (by selection, of leaves from tree) the elements which we
want to use for realization of a given security service then we can compute
P . For every selected leaf we compute a probability of an incident occurrence
according to the formulas:
PP = (1− (LK(1− ωLK) + LP (1− ωLP )))(LZ + (1− LZ)(C +M))
P δ = PP + [δ(1− PP )] δ = (PP + I +H)
P = max(P δ)
where:
ωLK – the weight defining potential attackers’ lack of preparation in the domain
of knowledge;
ωLP – the weight defining potential attackers’ lack of preparation in the domain
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of costs;
ωLK + ωLP = 1
PP – the probability of a threat occurrence without considering the additional
δ parameter
P δ – the probability after taking into account the additional parameter δ
P – the probability of an incident occurrence for this service, within a given step.
Fig. 3. The components tree for security service: integrity.
1 Integrity
1.1 Integrity of data
1.1.1 HMAC codes
1.1.1.1 Cryptographic modules (min. level 2) (LZ=80%, LK=70%, LP=80%, C=0.05, M=0.01)
1.1.1.2 Cryptographic modules (min. level 3) (LZ=80%, LK=80%, LP=90%, C=0.05, M=0.02)
1.1.2 Ports and interfaces of cryptographic modules
1.1.2.1 Cryptographic modules (min. level 2) (LZ=70%, LK=50%, LP=80%)
1.1.2.2 Cryptographic modules (min. level 3) (LZ=70%, LK=70%, LP=80%)
1.1.3 Specification of cryptographic modules
1.1.3.1 Cryptographic modules (min. level 2) (LZ=70%, LK=50%, LP=80%)
1.1.3.2 Cryptographic modules (min. level 3) (LZ=70%, LK=70%, LP=80%)
1.1.3.3 Increase digest lengths (LZ=10%, LK=60%, LP=40%)
1.1.4 Encryption mode supports integrity
1.1.4.1 Cryptographic modules (min. level 2) (LZ=80%, LK=70%, LP=80%)
1.1.4.2 Cryptographic modules (min. level 3) (LZ=80%, LK=80%, LP=90%, M=0.01)
1.1.5 Keys distribution (LZ=80%, LK=50%, LP=80%, C=0.02)
1.1.6 Key usage (LZ=80%, LK=80%, LP=50%)
1.1.7 Compression method supports integrity (LZ=30%, LK=80%, LP=50%, C=0.01)
1.1.8 Audit (LZ=10%, LK=60%, LP=40%, C=0.01, M=0.03)
The leaves are described using the terms from [10].
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3.3. The impact of a successful attack (ω).
The impact of a successful attack is the second parameter (besides P ) asso-
ciated with risk. We calculate it, as previously, for each service in each step.
We use for calculation direct and indirect parameters, presented below.
The direct parameters:
LZ – assets gained during a successful attack on given security elements (100%
is the compromise of the whole protocol);
F – financial losses during a successful attack on given security elements (100%
is the total financial loss).
The indirect parameters:
α – necessary financial costs for repairing the damages gained during a success-
ful attack (100% is the maximal cost);
β – losses of the value of the company shares or the company reputation (100%
is the maximal market loss).




(F + β + α).
3.4. Security level (FS).
The global security level expresses the security of the whole cryptographic















Z [(1− ωxij)(1− P xij,ALL)]
where:
FS is the security level realized by a given version of cryptographic protocol,
FS ∈ (0,1)
i is the number of subprotocols in a given protocol;
j is the number of steps in a given subprotocol;
x is the number of specific security services;
ωxij is the weight describing an average cost of losses after a successful attack
on a given service, ω ∈ (0,1);
Lxij is the value of a protection level for a given service, L ∈ (0,1);
P xij is the probability of an attack on a given service, P ∈ (0,1);
Z is the scalability parameter for security elements, Z ∈ (0,10).
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4. Security Protocol Optimization Tool
Security Protocol Optimization Tool (SPOT) is the element of the architec-
ture presented in [12]. For purposes of this article we present only key elements
and aims of the SPOT. The main goal of the SPOT is to implement the Model
briefly presented in Section 3 and completely in [4]. By this tool we can create
versions of a given protocol, compare these versions and visualize the results.
It is also designed to be portable and user–friendly so the interface to the ap-
plication is realized by means of the graphic panels. The important feature
of the SPOT is the optimization module, which is capable of generating all
states of a given protocol and shows the optimal states according to the user’s
preferences. This module can print this information and their impact on the
security level (P and LZ parameter). This way, the user can choose the security
elements that give him desirable results.
Fig. 4. (SPOT) Optimization of the security service: integrity.
5. Optimization of the protocol
In this section we characterize the scenario of the TLS protocol communi-
cation in detail. We define the parameters required for the calculation of the
security level (FS) for the particular version of the TLS protocol. Finally, we
optimize the TLS protocol by selections of the security elements. For each
service, after selection of appropriate elements, FS with indirect parameters
are presented and that configuration is represented a distinct version. The
first version of the protocol is represented as VF . In this version we change
configuration to optimize Integrity and we obtain as results VI . By selecting
more secure mechanisms as regards confidentiality we achieve the version VI,C ,
which is derived from VI . Optimization of authorization, in VI,C gives us the
last version VI,C,Au.
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5.1. Version of the TLS Handshake protocol.
In our example we assume that parties of protocol transfer critical data within
a reputable organization. We also assume that Client and Server are high–
performance systems (a lot of CPU and RAM). In these conditions our priority,
during protocol optimization, is security. In the first step of optimization, we
determine which security service is required for single steps of a given protocol.
In the article we chose the security services which are presented in Table 2.
”YES” in the table means that the appropriate service is realized in a given
step, and ”NO” means that the service is not realized. So, in Step 1 we ensure
only integrity of data. There is integrity and authorization in Step 2. All
services are in Step 3 and Step 4: integrity, confidentiality, and authorization.
Table 2. Selected security services



















I YES YES YES YES
C NO NO YES YES
Au NO YES YES YES
Table 3. Selected security mechanisms for the security services



















I 1,4 1,2 1,2,3,4 1,2,3,4
C NO NO 1,2,3 1,2,3
Au NO 3 1,2,3,4,5 1,2,3,4,5
Next we assign security mechanisms which realize the security service chosen
before. In our case, security mechanisms possible to select are presented in
Table 1. We present selection of mechanisms which realize appropriate security
service in Table 3. Numbers in this table identify the mechanisms according
to Table 1. In the next step, the value of other model parameters must be
defined. According to our communication scenario (critical data and reputable
organization) for the parameters F, α, β, PP, I,H we set a high value, it is
presented in Table 4. Also, we set Z equal 1. The first choice of the security
elements (from security trees) is standard in each step and service. To realize
security services and mechanisms we choose in the base configuration: HMAC-
MD5 for Integrity, RC4 with 128 bytes key for confidentiality and RSA with
the standard verification for authorization.
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Table 4. Parameters for the basic version of TLS protocol
LZ F α β
Step 1
I 0.7 0.88 0.83 0.92
Step 2
I 0.8 0.96 0.89 0.87
Au 0.7 0.97 0.87 0.95
Step 3
I 0.7 0.82 0.79 0.92
C 0.8 0.98 0.86 0.92
Au 0.7 0.98 0.97 0.92
Step 4
I 0.7 0.97 0.94 0.98
C 0.8 0.98 0.99 0.98
Au 0.7 0.99 0.98 0.97
5.2. First results and the analysis (VF ).
When we define all model parameters we can compute global security level
FS . This version of the protocol we define as VF . Table 5 presents the global
security level FS with the main model parameters P , ω, L
Z . The results are
presented for all protocol steps and required security services in these steps.
We have obtained FS = 0.0694744 and probabilities range from 0.672065 to
0.8106986. These values for P parameter are high (maximum level = 1 ). In
the article we use Optimization Module from SPOT, introduced in Section 4,
for reducing the value of P parameter. In the next sections, the optimization
of probability of incident occurrence (P ) will be described. This process can be
realized for all steps of the protocol and for specific security service in them.
5.3. Optimizing the results: integrity (VI).
In each step of TLS protocol we use Optimization Module for integrity and
the results are shown in Fig. 4. We have observed that using cryptographic
modules on level 3 is more secure (according to [10]). In integrity trees, these
modules represent the HMAC codes, encryption (with the appropriate mode)
and compression methods. Applying to the Optimization Module we decided
to increase length of key and use advanced keys management for Step 3 and
Step 4. We have done it by using SHA–256 instead of MD5 for HMAC. SHA–
is considered more secure and its digest is longer. By these changes we have
achieved expected effects. That configuration is represented in our paper as
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VI . The results after integrity optimization are presented in Table 6. After
this optimization FS = 0.08213736. This is due to a large reduction in the
parameter P in every step. The first stage of optimization refers to Integrity,
in the next steps other security services will be optimized.
Table 5. First results for our version (VF )
P ω LZ
Step 1
I 0.6858307 0.6136666 0.7
Step 2
I 0.7187909 0.7253333 0.7
Au 0.7941681 0.650999 0.1
Step 3
I 0.6858307 0.5903333 1.0
C 0.7287932 0.7360000 1.0
Au 0.8106986 0.6696667 1.0
Step 4
I 0.672065 0.6743333 1.0
C 0.7287932 0.7866667 1.0
Au 0.8106986 0.6860000 1.0
FS 0.0694744
Table 6. Results after I optimization (VI)
P ω LZ
Step 1
I 0.477998 0.7013333 0.7
Step 2
I 0.4988449 0.7253333 0.7
Au 0.7941681 0.650999 0.1
Step 3
I 0.5900936 0.5903333 1.0
C 0.7287932 0.7360000 1.0
Au 0.8106986 0.6696667 1.0
Step 4
I 0.5676999 0.6743333 1.0
C 0.7287932 0.7866667 1.0
Au 0.8106986 0.6860000 1.0
FS 0.08213736
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5.4. Optimizing the results: confidentiality (VI,C).
The confidentiality of the data is required in Step 3 and Step 4 (Table 2). In
Confidentiality we use cryptographic modules mainly for encoding/decoding data,
additionally in Step 3 Client must securely generate keys. Originally selected security
elements were: cryptographic modules for every operation on level 2, standard length
of the key, standard keys management. Using Optimization Module for
confidentiality we found the most secure selection for this version of the protocol. We
set cryptographic modules to level 3, standard length of key has been increased and
we have applied advanced keys management. These settings have been mainly caused
by choice of AES256–CBC algorithm instead of RC4. In Step 3 we also assume using
of the secure PRNG function for Key Generation. Each of these components is
described in [10] and as mentioned before, this version designated as VI,C . After
applying these changes we have calculated new results. They are shown in Table 7.
There was a significant increase the FS . Before changes FS was equal to 0.08213736,
now FS = 0.09844751. This is due to the change in the parameter P for
Confidentiality. In Step 3, parameter P has changed from 0.7287932 to 0.5676999 but
in Step 4 it has changed from 0.7287932 to 0.4988449.
5.5. Optimizing the results: authorization (VI,C,Au).
Authorization of the parties of protocol is required in Steps 2, 3 and 4. The trees of
the authorization are very complex so the use of the Optimization Module is
necessary. We can notice that in Table 7 the probabilities of an incident occurrence
are high only for the authorization service. For optimization we have switched
cryptographic modules to level 3, we have applied longer keys and advanced keys
management. These changes have improved P parameter only in Step 3. By using
Optimization Module we have noticed that high P is caused by the security elements
associated with a certificate authority (CA). Optimization Module has generated
several selections, where P of each selection was < 0.5 for Step 2. For Step 3 and
Step 4 we have obtained a few selections, where P was < 0.75. According to these
selections we have changed security elements. A standard parties verification was
replaced by detailed verification. We assumed that it is possible to verify party of the
communication at any time and that the revocation of the certificate may take up to
24 hours. This configuration of the protocol is defined as the version VI,C,Au.
5.6. Final results.
The TLS protocol guarantees the three main security services: integrity,
confidentiality and authorization. The optimization process is completed when these
required security services are optimized. The final results are presented in Table 8.
Comparing the final results with the base results which are presented in Table 5 one
can notice that probability of incident occurrence P for all steps decreased
significantly. Consequently, the security level increased from 0.0694744 to 0.10750219.
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Table 7. Results after C optimization (VI,C)
P ω LZ
Step 1
I 0.477998 0.7013333 0.7
Step 2
I 0.4988449 0.7253333 0.7
Au 0.7941681 0.650999 0.1
Step 3
I 0.5900936 0.5903333 1.0
C 0.5676999 0.6440000 1.0
Au 0.8106986 0.6696667 1.0
Step 4
I 0.5676999 0.6743333 1.0
C 0.4988449 0.7866667 1.0
Au 0.8106986 0.6860000 1.0
FS 0.09844751
Table 8. Final results (VI,C,Au)
P ω LZ
Step 1
I 0.477998 0.7013333 0.7
Step 2
I 0.4988449 0.7253333 0.7
Au 0.4418600 0.2790000 0.1
Step 3
I 0.5900936 0.5903333 1.0
C 0.5676999 0.6440000 1.0
Au 0.7079023 0.6696667 1.0
Step 4
I 0.5676999 0.6743333 1.0
C 0.4988449 0.7866667 1.0
Au 0.7079023 0.6860000 1.0
FS 0.10750219
6. Conclusions
The presented methodology of protocol optimization has many advantages. We can
work with any security protocol or just communication process. Furthermore, using
the SPOT we can easily create versions of a given protocol and we can change them
depending on the assumed scenario. We have presented methodology on the very
popular protocol and we assume the scenario often realized. The protection of the
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TLS protocol was guaranteed only by the options provided by its developers. This
gives us the confidence that the protocol can not be accidentally broken. The cipher
suite used before optimization was TLS–RSA–WITH–RC4–128–MD5, now it is
TLS–DH–RSA–WITH–AES–256–CBC–SHA256. The exact description of these
suites is in [6]. Applied changes are unfavorable for the protocol efficiency but during
our optimization we assume that the security not efficiency of the protocol will be
optimized. Finally, the global security level increases by 0.03802779 and it is ”55%”
of the base value of FS .
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